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I. Introduction

The popularity of virtual worlds is growing. Millions ofpeople around the
globe interact in these worlds every week, transact with others, and even make
their living trading virtual goods.' As virtual worlds turn into a mainstream
*
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Director, Information + Innovation Policy
Research Centre, LKY School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
1. See Robert D. Hof, M* Virtual Life, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 1, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_l 8/b3982001.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (discussing the immense popularity of virtual words and the breadth of activities carried
on within them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Wagner James Au,
The Top 10 Money-Making MMOs of 2008, GIGAOM, Feb. 1, 2009, http://gigaom.com/
2009/02/01/top-10-money-making-mmos-2008 (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (listing the most
prosperous massively multiplayer online worlds (MMOs)) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). For information on the size of user populations, see, e.g., Comparison of
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison
_ofMMORPGs (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). For an overview of the economics of the virtual world Second Life, see Second Life,
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mass phenomenon, lawmakers and courts are beginning to turn their focus on
them. Increasingly, conflicts arise in these worlds among their participants
that they desire to have settled in the virtual world, by the virtual world
provider, or by real-world courts. At other times, those participating in virtual
worlds so thoroughly disagree with the commercial entities that provide and
manage a virtual world as to take action, individually or collectively, to change
the rules that govern it.4 Finally, alerted by media coverage, real-world
policymakers-legislators and regulatory agencies-ponder and even advocate
new rules to curb behavior in virtual worlds.5
It is an exciting new frontier for lawyers, courts, and lawmakers, as well as
legal academics, as the surge in recent law review articles demonstrates. 6 Many
Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-data.php (last visited Sept. 29,
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For excellent data on the
demographics of participants in virtual worlds, see Nick Yee, The Daedalus Gateway,
http://www.nickyee.com/daedalus/ gatewaydemographics.html (last visited Sept. 29,2009) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Viktor Mayer-SchOnberger & John
Crowley, Napster'sSecond Life?: The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1775, 1781-89 (2006) (chronicling the development of virtual worlds). See generally
EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS (2005).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Musil, CaliforniaLawmakers ConsiderCyberbullyingBill, CNET
NEWS, Aug. 11, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10015079-93.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2009) (discussing California lawmakers' attempts to curb cyberbullying) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(involving a dispute between Mark Bragg, a participant in Second Life, who had exploited a
fault in the Second Life system to his financial benefit, and Linden Research, the providers of
Second Life, which in response confiscated Bragg's virtual property).
4. See, e.g., Wagner James Au, Virtual Protest Threatens Linden's Profitability,
GIGAOM, Oct. 30, 2008, http://gigaom.com/2008/10/30/protest-threatens-linden-labs-profit
ability (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (reporting on user protests in reaction to Second Life's
decision to increase user fees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a case of
user protest that drastically changed the trajectory of a virtual world, see WAGNER JAMES Au,
THE MAKING OF SECOND LIFE 123-39 (2008).
5. In the European context, see, e.g., Council Resolution, On the Protection of
Consumers, in Particular Young People, Through the Labeling of Certain Video Games and
Computer Games According to Age Group, 2002 O.J. (C65) 2, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:065:0002:0002:EN:PDF; see also
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, On the Protection of
Consumers, in Particular Minors, in Respect of the Use of Video Games (Apr. 22, 2008),
availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0207:FIN:EN:
PDF.
6. See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual PropertyRights in Virtual Environments:
Consideringthe Rights of Owners, Programmersand VirtualAvatars, 39 AKRON L. REv. 649
(2006) (addressing legal rights in virtual worlds); Jack M. Balkin, VirtualLiberty: Freedom to
Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043 (2004) (discussing real-
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of the debates of earlier internet days on the role of law in cyberspace are being
replayed in the virtual world context, from the factualT7 -which real-world law
applies to a particular interaction in a virtual world-to the normative whether or not virtual worlds require a new regulatory framework.
world law in virtual worlds); Mark Bartholomew, Advertising in the GardenofEden, 55 BuFF.
L. REV. 737 (2007) (arguing against advertising in virtual worlds); Caroline Bradley & A.
Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, RealRules, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 103 (2004) (proposing
the use of virtual worlds for governance); Bryan T. Camp, The Play's the Thing: A Theory of
Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing taxation in the virtual world
context); Joshua Fairfield, VirtualProperty,85 B.U. L. REv. 1047 (2005) (suggesting the use of
property law in virtual contexts); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Laws of the Virtual Worlds] (suggesting virtual
worlds often implicate real-world issues); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, Virtual Crimes,
49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 293 (2004) (questioning if and when virtual conduct gives rise to
criminal liability); Greg Lastowka, User-GeneratedContent and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 893 (2008) (commenting on the role of user-generated content and potential
problems arising from its use); Leandra Lederman, "StrangerThan Fiction": Taxing Virtual
Worlds, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1620 (2007) (suggesting different types of virtual transactions merit
different taxation treatment); Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: A Second Lifefor Earth?,
2008 BYU L. REV. 47 (2008) (analyzing the environmental impact of virtual living); Erez
Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and ContractLaw at the Dawn of the VirtualAge, 82
IND. L.J. 261 (2007) (advocating for the use of copyright law in virtual worlds); Kevin
Saunders, Virtual Worlds-Real Courts, 52 ViLL. L. REv. 187 (2007) (considering the realworld law's role in the virtual context); David P. Sheldon, Comment, Claiming Ownership, but
Getting Owned: ContractualLimitationson AssertingPropertyInterests in Virtual Goods, 54
UCLA L. REv. 751 (2007) (discussing the allocation of rights in virtual context and the need for
legislative regulation to protect these rights); Bobby Glushko, Note, Tales ofthe (Virtual) City:
Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507 (2007)
(discussing the problems arising from end-user license agreements in virtual worlds); Bettina
Chin, Note, Regulating Your Second Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REv.
1303 (2007) (advocating the introduction of self-regulatory measures); Steven J. Horowitz,
Note, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443 (2007)
(discussing labor-based property claims); Phillip Stoup, Note, The Development andFailureof
Social Norms in Second Life, 58 DuKE L.J. 311 (2008) (noting the role of social norms in
virtual worlds).
7. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 6, at 738-50 (discussing advertising in virtual
worlds); Camp, supranote 6, at 44-70 (analyzing tax issues in virtual worlds); Fairfield, supra
note 6, at 1052-58, 1072-75 (examining the notion of virtual property, and how property laws
can constrain the Internet anticommons); Laws of the Virtual Worlds, supra note 6, at 8-10
(focusing on the legal context of destruction of virtual property); Lederman, supra note 6, at
1641-55 (discussing the federal income tax issues in virtual worlds); Reuveni, supranote 6, at
270-75 (arguing that copyright law applies to creations in virtual worlds).
8. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 2053-57 (discussing First Amendment
consequences of real-world commodification); Bradley & Froomkin, supra note 6, at 103-12
(examining whether virtual worlds might be designed to test laws); Laws ofthe Virtual Worlds,
supra note 6, at 29-50 (discussing property and governance challenges in virtual worlds);
Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1 (suggesting that virtual worlds may be provided
peer-to-peer ifreal-world regulators clamp down on virtual worlds); Chin, supranote 6, at 1307
(arguing that some pecuniary losses suffered in virtual worlds should be recognized by the real-
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This Article does not add directly to these debates, but rather takes a look
at a more foundational question: Is there a structural constraint to the extent
existing real-world regulators can regulate virtual worlds effectively?
Part II of this Article looks at how the regulatory dynamic among virtual
worlds shapes the regulability of virtual worlds by real-world regulators. Part
III examines the possible tools real-world regulators have at their disposal to
increase their regulability, and those tools' effectiveness. Part IV details the
tension among two types of real-world regulators, which this Article terms
"public values" and "choice" regulators, that place a structural limit on the
regulability of virtual worlds, irrespective of the regulatory tools employed.
This Article suggests that, given the current setup of real-world regulators, this
structural limitation cannot be overcome. Hence, this Article concludes by
postulating a "virtual world regulability limitation principle" similar to the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Einsteinian physics.
II. The Regulatory Dynamic of Virtual Worlds
When we imagine the regulatory context of virtual worlds, we are tempted
to picture a number of individuals who participate in a virtual world created
and managed by a particular provider, who in turn is subject to real-world rules.
A virtual-world provider may shape how participants of her world behave
in two distinct ways. First, a virtual-world provider combines hardware and
software to a system that runs a particular world. By designing the system, the
provider can permit or interdict certain user behavior. For example, Linden
Lab, the provider of virtual world Second Life, enables (and thus permits) its
users to fly-that is, to move around the world by spreading one's arms like a
bird. If Linden Lab would like to stop letting users fly inworld, it could simply
modify the code that runs Second Life. In this very direct sense, rules
constraining behavior in virtual worlds are embedded in the software code that
runs the world. As users have to use that code to access the world, enforcement
9
is practically perfect. It is an extreme example of Lessig's "code is law."
Second, a virtual-world provider mandates (or proscribes) user behavior
through the "Terms of Service" and "End-User License Agreement" (EULA).
Users have to agree to abide by both when joining the world. 10 Through this
world legal system); Glushko, supra note 6, at 508 (suggesting that EULA and similar
agreements for virtual worlds are inadequate and in need of change).
9. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 3-8 (1999).
10. See Glushko, supra note 6, at 515-17 (describing the role of the EUJLA in virtual
worlds). See generally Sheldon, supra note 6; Horowitz, supra note 6.
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contractual arrangement, the provider maintains the power to set rules inworld
and to enforce them by threatening and implementing punishment, from point
deductions and resetting transactions all the way to the ultimate penalty:
Temporary or permanent banishment from the virtual world."l Relying on such
contractual rules is effective as long as the potential punishment is a strong
enough deterrent to affect user behavior.
In turn, a virtual world provider has to abide by the relevant legal rules in
its respective jurisdiction. However, this picture of participants being regulated
by a virtual-world provider who in turn has to abide by real-world rules of her
jurisdiction is incomplete in at least two ways.
First, there are multiple providers of virtual worlds, not just one. These
providers all aim to attract individuals to join their virtual world and keep them
participating. 12 For providers, participants are the central resource. They
generate revenue, whether through monthly participation fees, money paid to
use virtual goods inworld-everything from swords to virtual land--or fees
levied on inworld commercial transactions. 13 Additional participants also add4
value to the virtual world as they represent opportunities for others to interact.
Economists call this a network effect when participant growth pushes up
network value-the sum of possible interaction opportunities-in a nonlinear
15
fashion.
As much as virtual worlds want users to join them, users have just as
much freedom to choose among the existing worlds that vie for them. Users
can shop for the cheapest world, look for the most sophisticated world, or try to
find the best deal. They are free to choose, but they have much at stake:
Joining a particular virtual world often entails making a significant
commitment, not so much in money, but in time to that world. Regularly, many
hours of inworld activity are necessary to understand the world, and to build up
a social network of inworld friends to enjoy what the virtual world has to offer.

11. For a gripping early case of banishment, see JULUAN DIBBELL, MY TNy LiFE 18 (1998)
(telling of a "rape in cyberspace" in which the perpetrator was "toaded," that is, officially deleted
from the servers). For information on inworld enforcement, see also Mayer-Sch6nberger &
Crowley, supra note 1, at 1797-1802, and Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, The Shape of
Governance: Analyzing the World ofInternet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 605,633 (2003).
12. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1802-05 (detailing provider
strategies to attract and retain users).
13. See id.at 1803-04 (noting the commercial nature of virtual worlds).
14. See id. (explaining that worlds with larger user population present more attractive
networking opportunities for users).
15. See generally Bob Metcalfe, There Oughta Be a Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1996, at
D7; Oz SHY, THE ECONOMICS OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 3-6 (2001).
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In this respect, the situation resembles the one faced by emigrants. Before
users join a particular world they have considerable freedom of choice, but this
freedom is saddled with the heavy burden of having to choose the right world
to homestead. Once they have joined and begun to invest time and effort
inworld, they are much more reluctant to leave the world and join another, as
"switching-costs" would be high.
Choosing the most appropriate world to join requires one to weigh
numerous factors.' 6 Obviously the context of the world-what it is-plays a
central role, and so does its popularity. Often the more participants flock to one
world, the more interesting it becomes for others to join as well. Similarly
significant is what participants can do in a virtual world, that is, how open or
constrained a world is.17 Relatively less important a consideration is price, as
the monthly fees paid to virtual world providers tend to be modest, particularly
in comparison 18to the significant time participants invest in recently joined
virtual worlds.
As a result, the image of many participants in one virtual world is
incomplete. It omits that there is more than one virtual world, and that these
worlds are locked in a competitive dynamic with each other over the primary
resource of revenue and success: Participants.
Secondly, the simple image also omits that providers of these virtual
worlds are not all located in the same jurisdiction. Instead they are scattered
around multiple jurisdictions, each with its unique regulatory framework
constraining what kind of virtual worlds can be legally provided.
As each jurisdiction offers a distinct regulatory framework-based on its
societal preferences-providers of virtual worlds, much like participants in
virtual worlds, face a choice; they can select the jurisdiction in which they want
to be located. Real-world businesses often base their location close to a
potential customer base. In contrast, virtual world providers are less pressured
16. See Mayer-Sch~nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1802-03 (noting some
considerations users weigh in choosing a virtual world).
17. This, for example, prompts participants in the relatively restrictive WorldofWarcrafi
to utilize the less constraining world SecondLife to plan their World of Warcraft missions. For
an account, see Regine Debatty, Joichi Ito on World of Warcraft, WORLDCHANGING, Jan. 5,
2007, http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/005736.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). "Restrictive" of course is a very subjective
concept; a world that is much too restrictive for one may be perfectly "free" enough for others.
Also, real-world conceptions of societal constraints do not map very well onto virtual worlds,
and vice versa, so it is wrong to equate a less restrictive virtual world with real-world liberal
democracies.
18. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1802-03 (explaining that the
time a user devotes to participating in the virtual world is the most valuable investment).
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to locate in proximity to customers; they utilize the Internet to communicate
with them. At least in principle, this gives providers more freedom to choose a
suitable jurisdiction. Of course, virtual world providers also have to consider
other important factors when choosing location, including the availability of
human resources, capital, and infrastructure connectivity, similar to their realworld brethren.
Real-world lawmakers may be tom. On the one hand, they may want to
preserve the value choices of their societies embedded in their regulatory
frameworks. On the other hand, they may want to attract businesses to their
jurisdiction, and thus-at least to an extent-be willing to modify their
regulatory framework to look more hospitable. To what extent they are willing
to adapt their laws depends in part on how deeply held and entrenched the rules
are that may need to be changed, and in part on how strongly a jurisdiction
desires to attract virtual world providers. Irrespective of the specifics of each
case, however, the result is a dynamic of regulatory interaction among realworld regulators to attract virtual world providers to their jurisdictions, driven
in significant9part by the freedom of choice providers have to select a suitable
jurisdiction.'
Thus, the initial image of multiple participants engaging in a specific
virtual world managed by a provider in a particular jurisdiction is too simple; it
fails to account for the regulatory dynamics among providers when participants
choose worlds, and among real-world regulators when providers decide on the
jurisdiction in which they want to be located.

19. One mode of such regulatory interaction is competition among regulators (and thus
jurisdictions). However, even when regulatory competition dominates the regulatory dynamic
between jurisdictions, a ratcheting down of regulatory frameworks (regulatory "race to the
bottom") does not necessarily ensue. On modes of regulatory interaction, see David Lazer,
Regulatory Interdependence and InternationalGovernance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 474, 478
(2001), David Lazer, Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of Interdependence in
RegulatoryPolicymaking, 12 EuRo. L.J. 455,457-66 (2006), and David Lazer & Viktor MayerSch6nberger, Governing Networks: Telecommunications Deregulation in Europe and the
UnitedStates, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 826-38 (2002). On regulatory "races to the bottom,"
compare William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 663-65 (1974) (suggesting that regulatory competition has lead to a
deterioration of regulatory standards), with Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARv. L.
REv. 588, 594-96 (2003) (arguing that Delaware is attractive not because of a lenient regulatory
framework but an efficient and knowledgeable judiciary). See also DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP:
CONSUMER AND ENvIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248, 259-60 (1995)
(describing the "California Effect," a theory that regulatory enactment is enabled by free market
forces); Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: Which Model for
Europe?, 12 Euto L.J. 440, 450 (2006) (comparing the US model of interstate competition with
the European model centered around a single market).
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Potential participants in virtual worlds benefit the most from this stacked
regulatory dynamic. Largely unencumbered, they can choose on two levels.
They can select among a multitude of virtual worlds managed by providers in
multiple jurisdictions-and thereby choose the world that most closely
correlates to their own individual preferences. Providers of virtual worlds, too,
enjoy some freedom of choice. They can select the jurisdiction in which they
want to be based, and all else being equal, will likely select a jurisdiction that
offers a regulatory framework most conducive to managing a virtual world. By
the same token, providers face competition in attracting customers. The value
for providers of being able to arbitrage out of a real-world jurisdiction and
relocate to a more hospitable one is offset by their customers' ability to do the
same.
Real-world lawmakers are not so fortunate. They face arbitrage of
valuable resources on two levels. First, providers can relocate to a different
jurisdiction, arbitraging out of a real-world regulatory framework they find too
stifling-and thus depriving lawmakers of tax income, and society of
employment opportunities and the like. Second, even if providers stay put,
present and future participants in virtual worlds may switch to a different
virtual world managed by a provider in a different jurisdiction that is more
hospitable to virtual worlds that most closely match the participant's personal
preferences.
III. Countermeasures: IncreasingRegulability of Virtual Worlds
Real-world lawmakers have a number of tools at their disposal to counter
the danger of regulatory arbitrage on both the customer and provider level.
One countermeasure is to limit the ability of virtual world users to
participate in virtual worlds provided in another jurisdiction. 20 For example,
European lawmakers could prohibit European citizens from participating in a
virtual world managed by a provider located outside of Europe. Or they could
interdict the sale of virtual goods for real money, so that in the absence of
virtual-world interoperability, the switching cost to a virtual world hosted
abroad becomes prohibitively high. To an extent, such an approach has been
implemented recently as the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,
which constrains funds transfers between financial institutions and offshore

20. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1822 (suggesting lawmakers
could "constrain competition among virtual world providers by making it difficult for users to
switch providers").
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online gambling sites.2 1 The fundamental aim of such a countermeasure is obvious:
It attempts to reduce permeability between jurisdictions and the ability to arbitrage
by increasing switching costs, not primarily for virtual world providers, but for their
customers.
A second possible countermeasure is for real-world regulators to coordinate
among themselves, and thus to eliminate the competitive dimension of the
regulatory dynamic they face. Virtual world providers (and by extension their
customers) can only arbitrage out of a particular regulatory regime if it is confined to
a particular jurisdiction, and if other jurisdictions exist that do not impose similar
constraints. If, however, real-world jurisdictions coordinate to enact the same or
similar regulatory frameworks, the possibility for arbitrage would vanish for both
providers and customers. Regulatory coordination is the most effective
22
countermeasure to arbitrage; it simply stops regulatory competition.
The challenge lies in achieving a sufficiently broad and deep level of
coordination. It needs to be broad to encompass all or most real-world jurisdictions,
so as to eliminate or grossly limit the capability of providers and customers to
switch. And it needs to be sufficiently deep, that is, cover sufficient behavior, to
ensure that the coordinated set of rules is affecting arbitrage behavior. Because
virtual worlds are communicative spaces, such coordination would likely necessitate
an international agreement on permissible and prohibited speech. Given how
significantly different the laws on free (and proscribed) speech are in various
jurisdictions around the world, and how such laws reflect deeply held societal
values, finding sufficiently common ground for a coordinated approach quite likely
may pose an insurmountable challenge.23
21. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, §§ 801-803, 120
Stat. 1884, 1952-62 (2006) (codified as 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367); see Ryan S. Landes, Note,
Layovers and Cargo Ships: The Prohibitionof Internet Gamblingand a ProposedSystem of
Regulation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 913, 932-36 (2007) (explaining the issues related to the
government's regulation of off-shore gambling); see also Gerd Alexander, The U.S. on Tilt:
Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Is a Bad Bet, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH.
REv. 0006 (2008) (critiquing the Act). Such a leakage limiting approach may violate
international trade law. See generally Kathryn B. Codd, Note, Betting on the Wrong Horse:
The DetrimentalEffect of Noncompliance in the Internet Gambling Dispute on the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 941 (2007).
22. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1821-22 (proposing three
measures to counter regulatory arbitrage: harmonizing virtual world regulations across
jurisdictions, limiting users' ability to switch providers, and preventing users from choosing a
provider located outside of their real life jurisdiction); Lazer & Mayer-Sch6nberger, supranote
19, at 829-36 (providing three modes of regulatory interdependence). For a real-world case of
how coordination could stop regulatory competition, see Philipp Genschel & Thomas Plimper,
Regulatory Competition and InternationalCo-Operation, 4 J. EuR. PuB. POL'Y 626, 628
(1997).
23. I have sketched one potential way of finding a very narrow consensus based on
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A third countermeasure is for real-world regulators to agree on establishing a
joint meta-regulator that has the power to regulate virtual world providers directly
without requiring national regulators to coordinate and agree. The establishment of
a meta-regulator necessitates the delegation of regulatory power by real-world
regulators. In return, such meta-regulation ensures a common regulatory framework
(and thus the elimination, or at least vast reduction, of competition among realworld regulators) without requiring a potentially painstaking process of coordination
among jurisdictions. Because it requires delegation, it reduces regulatory freedom
of individual real-world regulators. On the upside, it enhances enforcement, while
shrinking regulatory complexity and reducing the possibility for arbitrage.
The idea of a meta-regulator may seem to contradict the conventional view of
national lawmakers retaining complete regulatory power.2 4 However, metaregulators do exist. Take for example the European Union. In accordance with its
unique structure, member states have delegated far-reaching powers to the Union.2 5
Three institutions at the Union level--the Commission, the Council, and the
Parliament-work together to craft and enact legislation, which member states are
bound to translate into national laws.26 As a result,the European Union as a metaregulator creates a more level regulatory playing field across EU member states
without the need for national legislatures to complete a complex process of
coordination.
These first three countermeasures are all based on conventional views of the
power of real-world regulators to enact and enforce rules. The threat of arbitrage is
reduced by limiting leakage, mostly through some form of coordination and
cooperation across jurisdictional boundaries. The obvious advantage of these
countermeasures is that they remain squarely within the existing conventional
peremptory norms of international law. See Teree E. Foster & Viktor Mayer-Sch6nberger, A
Regulatory Web: Free Speech and the Global Information Infrastructure,3 MICH. TELE. &
TECH. L. REV. 45, 56-61 (1997).
24. For a view emphasizing the power of national regulators, see JACK GOLDSMrrIH & TIM
Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 65-86

(2006).

25. For the standard competences, for example Articles 2-6 Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, see Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 2-6, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1.
26. See, e.g., Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008, O.J. (C 115) 1-388. If a member state
fails to implement a Union mandate, it faces court action before the European Court of Justice.
Id. art. 259. Under certain conditions European Union legal directives may become directly
applicable even without an act of national translation. See Case 26-62, NV Algemene
Transport-en Expeditie Ondememing van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue
Administration, European Court of Justice, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=CELEX:61962J0026:EN:HTML (Feb. 5, 1963) (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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system of real-world regulation through rule enactment and enforcement The equally
obvious shortcoming of these countermeasures is their reliance on the ability of
territorially bounded nation-states protecting the distinct values of their respective
societies to find sufficiently common ground for cross-jurisdictional action to
minimize arbitrage. The challenge is to be both broad and deep, because if only one
large jurisdiction opts to remain outside of such a coordinating setup, virtual world
providers could flock to it, and thus offer themselves (as well as2 7 their customers)
multiple options to arbitrage out of real-world regulatory regimes.
To overcome the structural shortcoming ofthese conventional countermeasures,
one could go beyond real-world regulators in the enactment and enforcement of rules
for virtual worlds, for example, by actively integrating into the regulatory mechanism
providers of virtual worlds. At first this may sound counterintuitive. Why would
providers, the immediate targets of real-world regulators, want to cooperate with those
that want to regulate them? Bringing providers into the regulatory fold becomes more
obvious, however, ifwe remember the context in which these providers operate. They
are squeezed between real-world regulators insisting that they enforce real-world rules
in the virtual world they provide, and the often quite different regulatory preferences of
their worldwide customers. If they disregard the former, they risk real-world
enforcement action, perhaps even criminal sanctions. If they disregard the latter, they
risk losing valuable customers, and thus revenues.
To be sure, providers can escape this predicament by relocating to a different
more welcoming real-world jurisdiction, but that move, too, may be costly and is
potentially risky-what guarantees that the new real-world jurisdiction will not tighten
its regulatory regime in the future? Arguably, for providers ofvirtual worlds, ensuring
a global level playing field of similar rules would eliminate the threat of customers
switching to competitors in less strict regulatory jurisdictions, and thus lower the
overall business risk providers face.
Moreover, by taking part in the regulatory process, providers may be given an
official and important voice in what rules are enacted.2 8 This is quite different from
indirectly influencing the lawmaking process. Instead of having to invest in informal
lobbying activities, real-world providers would be welcomed at the regulatory table
and encouraged to take part in the rule-dralting process. This could offer providers
some direct input in the design of the rules they are asked to enforce-a potential

27. See Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 11, at 629 ("If a global consensus cannot be
reached, but a few nations decide plurilaterally to enact and enforce their own cyber-rules, what
legitimacy do they possess to implicitly govern the citizens of states who have not joined the
group?").
28. On the concepts of"voice" and "exit," see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE INFiRMs, ORGANiZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970).

1256

66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1245 (2009)

improvement to the current situation in which they are obliged to enforce real-world
rules without having a formal say in the process of their creation.
Real-world regulators, too, could potentially gain from such a setup of hybrid
public/private governance. Bringing providers into the fold, for example, could
increase the chances for successful enforcement. As this Article has explained above,
providers, unlike real-world regulators, are uniquely positioned to enforce rules-by
adjusting the software code as well as amending the terms of service.29 Including
providers in a governance solution ensures that their enforcement tools-software
code and Terms of Service/EULAs-are utilized effectively. Equally important if
providers understand that this may create a more level playing field, the exact shape of
which they can influence, they may become less inclined to exercise arbitrage and
move to a different jurisdiction. Moreover, by including providers in the process of
governing, providers may identify with the jointly enacted rules and enforce them
deftly-much more so than if they were simply receiving orders from real-world
regulators. Finally, including providers into a mechanism to regulate virtual worlds
may also turn out to be cheaper for real-world regulators, as it effectively outsources
rule enforcement to them.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, real-world regulators have toyed around with such
30
hybrid governance mechanisms in other areas. Such a setup, termed co-regulation,
exists in a number of nations
to protect minors from questionable content3 as well as
32
to regulate advertising.
29. See supra,notes 9-11 and accompanying text (discussing provider's ability to control
user conduct by contractual agreement).
30. Cafaggi defines co-regulation as arrangements "where private regulators have been
called upon to take part in different stages of the regulatory process." See Fabrizio Cafaggi,
Rethinking Private Regulation in the EuropeanRegulatory Space 20, (EUI Law Working
Papers No. 2006/13, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?
abstractid=910870. Eijlander defines co-regulation as "cooperation between the public and the
private actors in the process of creating new rules." See Philip Eijlander, Possibilitiesand
Constraints in the Use of Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in Legislative Policy:
Experiences in the Netherlands-Lessonsto Be Learnedforthe EU?, Vol. 9.1, ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. (2005), http://www.ejcl.org/9 l/art9 1-1.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation
and Co-Regulation in EuropeanLaw: Where Do They Meet?, Vol. 9.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L.

(2005), http://www.ejcl.org/91/art9l-3.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. A recent study identified such co-regulation arrangements in Australia, Austria,
Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, and South Africa. See
Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the Media Sector, FINAL REPORT (Hans-BredowInstitute/EMR, Hamburg, Germany), June 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/
docs/library/studies/coregul/final rep en.pdf; see also Wolfgang Schulz, Neue Ordnungdurch
neues Medienrecht? Modelle der Co-Regulierung im Medienbereich, in ORDNUNG DURCH
MEDIENPOLITIK 217-32 (Otfried Jarren ed., 2007).
32. Co-regulatory regimes were found to exist in France, Germany, Greece, the
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Obviously, the approach works best when the co-regulation arrangement
between a traditional real-world regulator and private sector entities ensures a
high level of compliance, and when there is limited arbitrage among providers
(as well as users) to exit the jurisdictions and thus bypass the co-regulatory
framework; hence, its application to classical broadcast media, with limited
capacity for cross-jurisdictional spillovers. An Italian terrestrial broadcaster
unhappy with the national co-regulatory framework can hardly move to the
U.S. to sell her wares into Italy from there.
Language differences and relatively concentrated information flows may
make some co-regulation even feasible on the Internet, where technically
arbitrage is costless. 33 This is the reason why the co-regulation system of
protecting minors has been extended to Internet offerings in Australia,
Germany, and Italy.34 This is not to suggest that co-regulation is a superior
mechanism of governance; only that it offers real-world regulators a further
possible countermeasure against provider and user arbitrage.
The three countermeasures this Article has detailed are not necessarily
exclusive. It is possible to combine them to improve overall regulatory
effectiveness. Co-regulation, for instance, is not limited to cooperative
arrangements between private sector entities and national real-world regulators;
it may also be combined with meta-regulation.
The European Union, a meta-regulator, has been employing such a coregulatory approach in contexts like setting product standards 35 and protecting
the environment. 36 The European Commission aptly defines co-regulation as
combining "binding legislative and regulatory action with actions taken by the
actors most concerned, drawing on their practical expertise," and concludes that
"[t]his often achieves better compliance, even where the detailed rules are nonbinding."3 7 Unsurprisingly, given this strong endorsement, the European Union
Netherlands, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom See Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the
Media Sector, supranote 31, at 39-103.
33. Over time language barriers may recede and information flows shift to less
concentrated media, thus rendering co-regulation systems less effective.
34. Id.
35. At the heart of co-regulation in product standards setting is the European Union's socalled "New Approach"; see Council Resolution of 7 May 1985, On a New Approach to
Technical Harmonization and Standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1-9, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 31985Y0604(0I):EN:HTML.
36. See, e.g., Commission Recommendation of 5 Feb. 1999, On the Reduction of C02
Emissions From Passenger Cars, 1999 O.J. (L 40) 50, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/environment/air/transport/co2/99125/en.pdf.
37. European Commission White Paperon European Governance, at 21, COM (2001)
482 final (July 25, 2001).
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has announced its intention to use co-regulation more frequently. 38 Even more
to the point, recent studies commissioned by the European Union point towards
the regulation of virtual worlds as a possible new sector conducive to coregulation between private sector entities and the European Union.39
Thus it seems that at least in Europe the regulatory landscape for virtual
worlds may be developing toward a relatively distinctive arrangement of coregulation between a powerful real-world meta-regulator, the European Union,
and virtual world providers with their unique technical and organizational
enforcement capabilities.
IV. Tensions on the Meta-Level
So far, and despite some complexities, the overall narrative seems
relatively straightforward. Real-world regulators face potential arbitrage
behavior on two levels-among virtual world providers and among their
customers, the individual participants in virtual worlds. It is in the interest of
real-world regulators to limit this arbitrage.
This can be achieved primarily by moving the governance mechanism
either upward, toward a meta-regulator with a geographically broader
enforcement reach, or downward, by bringing providers into the regulatory fold
and thereby utilizing their technical and organizational enforcement
capabilities. Combining the two approaches for potentially unprecedented
effectiveness is co-regulation between providers and a meta-regulator, as
currently advanced by the European Union.
We began with a simple image of users participating in a virtual world
managed by a provider constrained by a real-world regulator. In such a setup,
there is no threat of arbitrage. But in reality, there is, and so we had to adapt
our image by adding multiple providers and multiple real-world regulators. As
a consequence, constraining arbitrage turned into one of the key strategies for
real-world regulators, and to achieve that we had to expand the governance
mechanism employed downward toward the private sector and upward toward a
meta-regulator. It seemed such a setup could establish an effective, yet stable,
governance mechanism for interactions in virtual worlds. But our hopes may
be squashed.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Study on Co-Regulation Measures in the Media Sector,supra note 31, at
39-103 (reporting the efforts of certain countries in co-regulating internet content); Eur. Comm.
Directorate-General, Optionsfor and Effectiveness oflnternet Self- and Co-regulation,RAND
REPORT TR-566-EC (Feb. 2008) (preparedby Jonathan Cave et al.).
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Co-regulation with a meta-regulator works because the meta-regulator can
overcome both the limited territorial reach of individual real-world national
regulators and the coordination challenge faced by multiple real-world national
regulators desiring to regulate jointly. This necessitates, however, that the
meta-regulator itself is a unitary entity with clear policy priorities. That is
rarely the case. In fact, the very structure of the governance mechanism
employed to regulate virtual worlds---co-regulation--may over time undermine
the ability of a meta-regulator to speak with one voice. Put more starkly,
broadening governance mechanisms to include providers may undermine the
very ability of a meta-regulator to act. This has to do with how co-regulation is
intended to work.
Co-regulation reaches out to providers. For regulation to be effective, the
providers representing most of the market especially have to be brought into the
regulatory fold. For example, when co-regulating with Internet search
providers, leaving out Google would render the regulatory attempt ineffective.
This is the reason why real-world regulators prefer highly concentrated or
highly organized markets for co-regulation because market concentration or
organization limits the number of private-sector entities with which they have
to cooperate and coordinate. Certain public values, like the protection of
minors, can be achieved more easily. Even where markets are more
fragmented, real-world regulators initially may reach out to a relatively small
number of private sector players or to professional associations or industry
groups representing a larger number of such players.
At the same token, even if in principle they are open for other private
sector entities to join, such arrangements may structurally advantage those that
are "in"-they potentially gain not only early access to pertinent regulatory
information, but also may have direct input in how the regulatory landscape is
being shaped. Insofar as this translates into market power, co-regulation may
potentially further concentration processes. If co-regulation is utilized to
protect public values in sectors that already have a relatively high market
concentration among a small number of players, ceteris parisbus such
concentration may increase further.
This may happen in the context of virtual worlds. Much of the market is
captured by a relatively small number of providers, arguably with Blizzard
4
Entertainment's World of Warcraft taking a huge lead among Western users. 0
This delights public values regulators, as they have a limited number of private
sector entities to include in co-regulation. Such market concentration, however,
40. See Wagner James Au, supra note 1 (reporting World of Warcrafl as the largest
grossing MMO of 2008, with estimated revenue in excess of $500 million).
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may worry regulators aiming to ensure robust and competitive markets, and real
choices for individuals selecting a virtual world to homestead in. As a result,
these "choice" regulators may desire to limit the concentration process among
virtual worlds, and to bolster competitive forces. The most obvious way to do
so (taking a page from recent telecom deregulation) is to lower switching costs
for individuals so that virtual world participants are not locked into worlds
managed by large incumbents. 41 There are numerous ways to lower switching
costs: from permitting virtual goods to be traded for real money to granting
users IP rights in their virtual goods to making virtual worlds interoperable.4 2
Initiatives such as OpenID 43 and OpenGrid 44 are already offering some
elements of interoperability,
and regulatory activity may give such efforts a
45
boost.
decisive
Any effort in lowering switching costs for participants, however, also
increases the likelihood of arbitrage-precisely what public values regulators
endeavor to limit. Much then depends on who regulates for public values, and
who regulates for market choice. If one is done by a national regulator, and the
other by a meta-regulator, the latter likely will prevail. If, however, both
public-value regulation and market-choice regulation happens at the same
governance level-it does not matter whether by a national or a metaregulator-the efficacy of such public-value regulation will likely prompt a
reactive market-choice regulation, and vice versa.
Some may argue that such infighting among regulators may be resolved
through further coordination in the legislative process. In theory, this may be
the case. In practice, however, legislative measures often do not arrive at the
same time, and the mechanisms by which they constrain each other may not be
apparent to legislators (or more selfish considerations for reelection may not
prompt them to care).46
41. On switching costs, see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 103-04
(1999).
42. For a discussion on the incentives for providers to offer interoperability, see MayerSch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 1, at 1815-17.
43. "OpenlD is an open, decentralized, free framework for user-centric digital identity."
OpenlD, What Is OpenID?, http://openid.net/what (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
44. OpenGrid permits virtual worlds based on the Second Life structure to interoperate,
see Second Life Wiki, Open Grid Public Beta, http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/
OpenGridPublicBeta (last visited Sept. 29, 2009).
45. See Urs Gasser & John Palfrey, Case Study: DigitalIdentity Interoperabilityand
elnnovation, (Berkman Cen. Res. Pub. No. 2007-11, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1070061 (considering the current state of user identification
interoperability).

46. The European Union is saddled with an additional structural challenge to resolve such
internal tensions, as certain market choice legislation can be enacted by the Commission without
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This troubling outcome is bound to happen whenever (a) co-regulation is
used as a governance mechanism to protect public values because the
theoretical risk of arbitrage is substantial and the sector to regulate is highly
concentrated, and (b) a separate regulatory entity is tasked with ensuring market
choice and robust competition.
In 1927, physicist Werner Heisenberg explained how the position and the
momentum of a particle cannot both be measured with certainty.47 The more
one pushes for precision of measuring one variable, the less exactly one will
know the value of the other. Even using the inclusive mechanism of coregulation to regulate virtual worlds, we encounter a somewhat similar barrier:
Real-world regulators cannot co-regulate for public values the way they have
without eventually triggering market-choice regulation that in turn triggers
public-values regulation and so forth. The more a regulator aims for market
concentration to co-regulate effectively for public values, the more this triggers
market-choice concerns-and thus regulatory action, and vice versa.
Much like position and momentum of particles are conjugated variables,
so are public values and market choice conjugated goals in the context of coregulation, fundamentally limiting the regulability of virtual worlds. This
Article thus suggests calling this the virtual world regulability limitation
principle.
VI. Conclusions
Real-world regulators intending to regulate virtual worlds face a complex
undertaking. With multiple virtual world providers in multiple jurisdictions,
both virtual world providers and users have some freedom of choice based on
their preferences. Real-world regulators may stem such arbitrage by reducing
permeability, coordinating with regulators in other jurisdictions, transferring
regulatory power to a meta-regulator, or co-regulation-including providers
into the regulatory and governance mechanism. These measures are not

the Council and the Parliament, while some public value legislation may not require
participation of the Commission. This cements rather than resolves the inherent tension of two
meta-regulators with two distinct value sets.
47. See Werner Heisenberg, Ober den anschaulichenInhalt der quantentheoretischen
Kinematik und Mechanik, 43 ZEITScHRinr FOR PHYsiK 172, 172-98 (1927) (articulating his
uncertainty principle of quantum physics); ROGER PENROSE, THE ROADTo REALrr (2004) 521-

24.
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necessarily exclusive, and combinations, such as co-regulation with a metaregulator, may offer improved effectiveness.
There is a limit, however, to what extent such co-regulation can be
successful. Public values and market choice are conjugated goals in the context
of co-regulation, fundamentally limiting the regulability of virtual worlds,
pointing toward a virtual world regulability limitation principle.

NOTES

